result for Merck and contributed to huge sales of rofecoxib. Some 20 million Americans took rofecoxib before it was eventually withdrawn from the market. Merck bought 900 000 reprints of the article from the New England Journal of Medicine at a cost estimated to be between US$700 000 and US$836 000 to use in promoting the drug. (My estimate is that this must have meant perhaps US$450 000 of profit for the journal: reprints have a very high profit margin.)
The trial also showed an increase in myocardial infarction in the patients given rofecoxib (0.4%) compared with those given naproxen (0.1%). (It is poor practice to publish only percentages not absolute numbers.) This was an unexpected result and the difference was interpreted by the authors to be caused by naproxen having a protective effect. In September 2004 Merck withdrew the drug from the market when it became clear that rofecoxib did have serious cardiovascular side effects.
In December 2005 the New England Journal of Medicine published an expression of concern about the VIGOR study saying that it ' . . . did not accurately represent the safety data available to the authors when the article was being reviewed for publication'. 11 These data showed that there were 47 confirmed serious thromboembolic events in the patients given rofecoxib and 20 in those given naproxenso wiping out the gastrointestinal benefits from rofecoxib. There were also three extra cases of myocardial infarction in the patients on rofecoxib that were not declared, although Merck had reported these cases to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in October 2000-before the paper was published. The data were posted on the FDA website soon after. If all of these data had been included in the original report the interpretation that naproxen was protective rather than rofecoxib harmful would have been much less convincing-indeed, it would probably have been untenable.
The New England Journal of Medicine reaffirmed its expression of concern in March 2006 after giving the authors a chance to explain themselves. 12 But is the New England Journal of Medicine blameless in all this? It published the expression of concern at the end of 2005 because the problems with the study had emerged as evidence was gathered for a court case against Merck brought by patients who allege that they have been damaged by rofecoxib.
It is clear, however, Jeff Drazen knew about these extra deaths long before the end of 2005. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal has discovered that Drazen was told about them in August 2001. 4 Jennifer Hrachovek, a pharmacist who had reviewed the data on the FDA website, told him on a phone-in to a Seattle radio show. She also submitted a letter to the journal, which was rejected. With hindsight the failure of the journal to publish a correction-and probably a reinterpretation of the cause of the excess cardiovascular
A u g u s t 2 0 0 6 side effects-is lamentable. If the journal had corrected the data then the dangers of the drug might have been highlighted much earlier.
But even without hindsight it seems poor practice not to publish a correction. Lots of what medical journals publish turns out to be 'untrue' and replaced by new evidence. So not every statement and interpretation can be corrected, but facts surely should be corrected. It is impossible to know which facts will turn out to be important. The journal had reason to suspect that there were three more cases of myocardial infarction than it had published 4 years before it drew attention to the fact.
The journal should probably also have given space to a different interpretation of the data. The FDA cast doubt on the hypothesis that naproxen had been protective-rather than rofecoxib harmful-as early as February 2001. In August 2001 a review of the complete data was published in JAMA casting doubt on the hypothesis that naproxen was protective. 13 Yet in that same month a review article on Cox-2 inhibitors was published in the New England Journal of Medicine that repeated the erroneous data and was reassuring on the safety of the drugs. 14 The expression of concern was rushed out at the end of 2005 to avoid bad publicity from presentation in a court case of evidence given on the background to the publication of the VIGOR trial paper by Gregory Curfman, executive editor of the journal. A public relations specialist advised the journal that the publication would divert attention from failings of the journal to the failings of Merck and the authors. 4 Why was the New England Journal of Medicine so slow to correct the record? The editors have suggested that the onus is on the authors to correct data; but it cannot be acceptable for editors to be put on notice that facts are wrong and to leave them unmodified. The editors also point out that the correct data were on the FDA website; but there is a world of difference between data on a website and data included in the world's leading medical journal and being circulated in nearly a million reprints. The editors must accept responsibility for the accuracy of facts in their own journal: they have a duty to their readers.
This convoluted story has now been made even more complicated by the New England Journal of Medicine having to publish a correction to the study it published in 2005 that was the death of rofecoxib. 15 The Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) study established the serious cardiovascular side effects of rofecoxib but also concluded that the increased risk became apparent only after patients had been taking the drug for 18 months. 16 It is this latter conclusion that the journal has had to correct. The study should have included an intention to treat analysis but did not, and Merck submitted the full data of the trial to the FDA a month ago, acknowledging that it had incorrectly described a statistical method. The original-and incorrect-conclusion was very important for Merck because it made it very difficult for anybody who had suffered an adverse cardiovascular event to sue if they had been taking the drug for less than 18 months.
The journal is no doubt embarrassed by this further twist. It was a failure of peer review, but peer review is an empty gun anyway-as I have argued in this journal before. 17 More worrying is the anxiety that the drug company has used the prominent pulpit of the New England Journal of Medicine to advance a message that was very much in its interest-but ultimately incorrect. It fits with the argument that medical journals are an extension of the marketing arm of pharmaceutical companies and that the full data of trials should be published not in medical journals, where an incomplete story is advanced, but on the web. 6, 18 Whatever the explanation for what has happened around the publication of these trials, the New England Journal of Medicine, and journals in general, have been damaged. Long-acting bronchodilators: time for a re-think
Asthma is a common chronic inflammatory disorder of the airways. It affects more than 5 million people, leads to around 70 000 hospital admissions and causes 1400 deaths every year in the UK alone. Despite a plethora of medical advances in this field over the last few decades the death rates show little improvement. Any further advancement in management is therefore both desirable and welcome. Beta-agonists now form the mainstay of reliever treatment for asthma. Since their introduction there have been numerous reports showing an increase in asthma mortality and morbidity. Various explanations have been offered for these adverse effects:
. toxicity of propellants causing bronchospasm . aggravation of hypoxaemia . cardiotoxicity secondary to hypoxaemia and hypokalaemia . increased amount of antigen on an unprotected airway . accumulation of toxic amounts of the distomer in racemic mixtures of sympathomimetics . tolerance/tachyphylaxis to the protective effects of beta-agonists. 1 In contrast to short-acting beta-agonists, long-acting ones (LABA) allow twice daily administration, making them extremely appealing. As such, increased compliance was expected and decreased mortality and morbidity anticipated.
Originally, very potent full beta2-agonists like fenoterol were used, quickly raising concerns regarding their safety profile. 2 The early 1990s witnessed the introduction of new, third-generation, highly-selective LABA that appeared to be safer than their predecessors. Salmeterol was such an agent. Shortly afterwards, and quite unexpectedly, an increase in asthma-related deaths was observed. The first randomized double-blind trial comparing symptoms control of salmeterol compared to salbutamol for 16 weeks, was soon reported with results that surprised many. 3 It was suggested that patients on the salmeterol arm were almost three times as likely to die from asthma-related deaths during the trial period. However, as overall events were infrequent this trend did not reach statistical significance. A clearly worried Food and Drug Administration requested GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), salmeterol's manufacturer, to investigate this matter further. This led to the initiation of the Salmeterol Multicenter Asthma Research Trial (SMART) which was published earlier this year. 4 SMART, a randomized, double-blind-controlled trial, recruiting patients older than 12 years of age, comparing the addition of salmeterol or placebo to existing asthma medication began in 1996. The primary endpoint was the outcome in combined respiratory-related deaths or lifethreatening experiences and the secondary endpoint was asthma-related deaths or life-threatening experiences. Subjects were randomized to receive either salmeterol 42 mcg twice daily via a metered dose inhaler or placebo, in addition to their routine asthma medication and use shortacting beta2-agonists for symptomatic relief.
Interim analysis was scheduled when half the subjects had been recruited (26 355 patients) and provisions made to allow stopping the trial if pre-defined criteria were met. 4 At this interim analysis, more patients on the salmeterol arm (37/13,176 versus 22/13,179 [confidence interval 1.01-2.89]) met the secondary endpoint criteria at a 95% level of significance. In addition, there were more overall respiratory-related deaths ( . increasing the sample by 10,000 subjects and completing the trial within 2 years or . stopping the trial prematurely and disseminating the results. 5 GSK opted for the latter. Using post hoc analyses, the role of inhaled corticosteroids (ICS) was also addressed, in spite of the fact that SMART was not designed to assess the effect of ICS in combination with salmeterol. Not surprisingly, those taking
